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this information to .the public (Glantz, et al. 1995). It was not until 1979 that the Surgeon-.General
conclusively stated that^igarettes were addictive. 3y-1986 the Surgeon General reported that cigarette
smoking-was the leading preventable cause of premature death and disability in the U.S; During this same
time frame, increasing excise taxes'were working in combination with the health warmngs to .diminish
aggregate smoking levels
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THE IMPACT OF ADDICTION:INFORMATION ON
I CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION .
Although per capita cigarette consumption in,the U.S. increased rapidly;until about
' 1960, the last four, decades have experienced a, steady-decline in smoking. of this
decline has been attributed to the increasing evidence of^health hazards ^sociated with
smoking. As early as 1953, the American Cancer Society and the,British Medical,Research
Council reported.that smoking caused increased mortality rates. By 1964, the Surgeon
General had linked smoking to cancer. In the ensuing 15 ye^s, health warnings were
' required to be printed on cigarette packs, and tobacco advertising was limited and eventually
banned from broadcast media. ,' Although major tobacco firms. Iqiew that cigarettes were
• addictive by the early 1960s, theydid not release this information to .the public (Glantz, et al.
1995). It was not until 1979 that the Surgeon-.General conclusively stated that^igarettes were
addictive. 3y -1986 the Surgeon General reported that cigarette smoking-was the leading
preventable cause of premature death and disability in the U.S; During this same time frame,
increasing excise taxes'were ^working in combination with the health warmngs to .diminish
aggregate smoking levels. . • _
Econometric studies of. the demand .for cigarettes have been numerous in the
• literature. In .the earliest studies,- cigarettes were modeled as a non-addictive good with
demand primarily dependent.upon income and own price (Hamilton^, 1972). Later, the
addictive nature of cigarettes was accounted for in, so-called "myopic" models by including
' ' ' !
past cigarette consumption as an additional, independent variable in the dem^d equation
(Winston. 1980).u These;models are-considered "myopic" because.past consumption was
assumed toistimulate current consumption, but individuals did not-consider the future impact
of current consumption when making consumption decisions. ,.
Alternatively, a number of previous authors considered models of habit-forming
goods in which utility-maximizing consumers took into account the impact of past and
current consumption on future choices. Past consumption of these goods was assumed to
affect current consumption by influencing the marginal utility of both current and future
consumption. In a model based on these principles, Becker and Murphy (1988) suggested
that consumers were "rational" agents and considered the future consequences of their
actions. Within a multiperiod utility maximization framework, Becker and Murphy
explicitly accounted for the addictive effects of nicotine by incorporating an addictive stock
into the utility function. Using an optimal control' approach, they derived time consistent
dynamic demand functions in which current consimiption depended on both past and future
consumption. Work by Chaloupka (1991) and by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (BGM)
(1994) gave empirical evidence to suggest that this rational model was more consistent with
the behavior of cigarette consumers than themyopic model.
• The specific focus ofthis study will be to analyze the impact ofaddiction information
on the demand for cigarettes. The basic underlying theory ofrational addiction that was used
by Becker and Murphy, Chaloupka, and BGM will also be used in this study, but it will be
modified somewhat both theoretically and empirically to account for the release ofaddiction
information in 1979. We posit that consumer demand was myopic before the release of
addiction information in 1979 but subsequently switched to a rational form after the
dissemination ofinformation. Our theoretical model suggests that this switch from amyopic
to a rational specification would result in structural ch^ges in the demand function
beginning in 1979. In addition, anumber of empirically testable restrictions on the signs and
relative magnitudes of the coefficients of the corresponding demand fimctions can be derived
from the theoretical model. We empirically test our hypotheses using state disaggregated
U.S. annual time series data from 1955 to 1994 comprised of consumption, price, and income
variables along with three smuggling indices.
^ . Theoretical Model . —
We assume that the behavior'.of cigarette consumers follows the model of rational
addiction used by Becker and Murphy,'Chaloupka, and BGM. -In keeping with.BGM who
specify the optimization process in terms" of .discrete fimctions and Ghaloupka's-discrete
version of the rational addiction model, the agent's utility function in period t is represented
by
U, =U(Y„C„A,,e,) (1)
f . jf' ' , . • ;
where C,' is consumption of the addictive good, Yt is the amount of.the composite good. A, is
the stock ofthe addictivegood,' and e, represents other uhobservable.life-cycle period t events
that impact utility. By assumption, Uy^ >.0, >0 and •<0;. Marginal utility is
assumed to increasewith the consumptiori'of.the composite good and the consumptionof the
addictive good, whileut is assumed-to decrease with increases in> the addictive stock. Thus,
the model accoimts'for'the preserice-of'tolerance (U^^,<0) and withdrawal (11^^ >0).
Tolerance refers to theteffect of achieving a Idwer.level .ofresponse from a given amount of
the addictive substance as the level of past consumption rises. .-Withdrawal refers to the
decline in utility from the reduction or cessation of consumption of the addictive good.
Reinforcement refers to the increasing benefits from" each, additional unit-of drug
consumption as the agent's past experience with the substance increases^ This is captured by
assuming that ^ • The utility function is also assumed to be strictly concave in Y„ C,
andAf. ;
The 1988 Surgeon General's Report points out that nicotine produces pleasurable
sensations,by accumulating in the brain soon after inhalation. The prolonged-use of nicotine
over time causes the body to be accustomed to a certain level of the drug. If the body
experiences a drop in the level of nicotine below the level that it is used to, then the person
experiences withdrawal. If nicotine did not' accumulate in the brain and produce its
pleasurable effects and cause subsequent bio-chemical dependence, one might argue that
nicotine is not addictive. In an economic model of addiction, the parallel would be a good
that did not accumulate an addictive stock. Hence, we modify Chaloupka's model by
specifying the following addictive stock equation:'
A, =(1-8)C,.,+(1-5)A,_,. (2)
Equation (2) states that A„ the addictive stock at any point in time, is equal to (l-5)C,.i, the
undepreciated portion oflast period's consumption, plus (1-5)A,.„ the undepreciated portion
of last period's addictive stock. The coefficient 5 is the rate at which last period's
consumption and the addictive stock decay. If the depreciation effects of the drug are
complete and instantaneous (i.e., 5=1), the addictive stock in period t will be zero even ifthe
person consumed the substance in the last period. Anon-addictive good is one that does not
accumulate an addictive stock. Thus, one could model a non-addictive good as a special case
of an addictive good with complete and instantaneous depreciation. This idea seems to be
consistent with the medical facts ofaddiction. Ifnicotine were instantly removed from the
body, it would not have the time to accumulate in the brain and produce pleasurable effects
or the longer term effects of bio-chemical dependence.^
Equation (2) is afirst-order linear difference equation in A,. Its solution is given by:
A, =i;(l-5)'-'Ci+(l-5)'A, • (3)N-i -1 VA V/y .^0-
\=0
:Chaloupka-s addictive stock equation is At=C,., +(1^) A,., . Note that even with fcii depreciation. Chaloupka's
model still has an addictive stock.
Totulr oTlsutners may be uncertain about the value of8or perceive different values of5dependtng on
information about theaddictive nature of nicotme.
Equation (3) implies. that the addictive'stock, at any point-in time t is .the sum of the
undepreciated remnants of previous consumption plus the Teniaining undepreciated amount
of the initial value of the addictive stock, Ao, that the personpossesses at time zero.^ Given
the assumption that the initial value of the addictive stock is zero, following-BGM equation
(3) reduces to:
. Ji;..• ' . !. ; 1j
t-i
A, =2]a-5)'"Ci. (4)
i=0
From equation (4) it is evident that for a depreciation rate less than one-hundred
percent, past consumption contributes to the addictive stock. However, for the case of
complete and instantaneous depreciation, the addictive stock is zero, giving rise to a good
whose-demand is independent of any habitual, aspects. In other words,,if a good is non-
addictive, it has a .depreciation rate of 6=l. If on the-.other hand,-the good is addictive, this
would correspond to a depreciation rate of 5<1; Thus, a simple modification of the addictive
stock constraint allows one to model the demand for both addictive and non-addictive goods
as sub cases of a more general'modeh
Next, in the interest of empirical tractability, we assume a simplified version of the
"addictive stock constraint similar to BGM in which only the previous period's consumption
enters into the addictive stock:'*. ' ' • ;
A,=(1-5)C,_,. , . , , (5)
Substituting out forA, and using equation (5) in equation (1)yields:
U, =U(Y„C.,(I-5)C,_„e,).;. , ^ (6)
3See Fenn (1998) for details.
Given that the agent lives for T years and discounts future utility at r, the rate of market
interest, the agent's lifetimeutility function canbewrittenas:
u(0)=X P'-'U(Y,,C„(1 - 5)C,_„e,) (7)
t«l
where B=—^—. pis the agent's discount factor.
(1+ r)
The lifetime budget constraint is given by:
XP'"'(Y,+P,C,) =W„. (8)
t=l
Wo is the present value of lifetime wealth, and the price of Y, is unity since Y, is the
numeraire. P, is the price ofthe addictive good in period t. Equation (8) is based upon the
assumption of the existence ofperfect capital markets.
The consumer maximizes lifetime utility given by equation (7) subject to an initial
value of consumption C° and the lifetime budget constraint given by equation (8). The
corresponding Lagrangian is: ...
L=y;p-'U(Y„C,,(l-5)C,_„e,) +X,{W„-X|3'-'(Y,+P,C,)}. (9)
Given that the choice variables are and C,, the resulting first order conditions are.
Uv,(Y„C,(l-5)C,.„e,) =X (10)
U,(Y„C„(l-5)C,.„e,) +P(l-5)U,(Y„„C„„(l-5)C„e,,,) =>^P,. OD
4BGM's simplifisd constraint is A, =Q-i. Thus, the notion ofdepreciation does not enter their specification.
The first order conditions can be interpreted as follows. Equation (10) states that the
m^ginal utility jfrom consuming the" composite good is equal to. the shadow price which
itself is the marginal utility of wealth. X is assumed to be constant. Thus, the demand
equation derived from the first order conditions (10) and (II) holds the marginal utility of
wealth constant. Equation (11) states that the present value of the marginal utility of ciirrent
consumption equals the product of current price multiplied by themarginal utility of wealth.
The rational addict not only considers the impact of current consumption on^is period's
marginal utility but also its impact on next period's utility through its contribution towards
next period's addictive stock. It is interesting to note that when there is no depreciation m
the model (i.e., 6=0), the resultmg first order conditions are identical to those of BGM.
Furthermore, when 5=1, the first order conditions given by equations (10) and (11),
respectively, are independent of C,., and C,^.„ the past and future values of consumption.
Thus, for the case of 6=1, equations (10) and (11) yield the first order conditions from the
dynamic utility maximization problem of a non-addictive good. Hence, one can model the
demand for both addictive and non-addictive goods as sub cases of the same time consistent
utility maximization problem. This approach eliminates the need for specifying different
utility functions for the same agent in order to model her consumption of both types of
''' • • ..w . • :
goods.
Derivation of the Rational Addiction Demand Function
In the interest of empirical tractability and in keeping iwith.BGM, the utility function
is assumed to be quadraticand is givenby equation (12). -
U, =U,C. +U,A, +U,.Y,-+U.e,+-^efAf•
^ ^ ^ ^
+U„C,A, +U,^C,Y, +U,.C,e, +U,,A,Y, +Uj.A,e, +U,.Y,e, (12)
Using this specific utility fimction, theexact forms of the first order conditions (equations (9)
and (10)) are;
. .U +U Y, +U, C, +U2y(l-5)C,_, +U^,e, (13)
[U,+U„C,"+U„(l-5)C,_,+U„Y,+U„e,]+p[U3(l-5) +U,,(l-5)^C,
+U„(1 - 8)C,„ +U,,(1 - 5)Y„, +U,, (1 - 5)e,„ ]=XP,. (14)
In keeping with BGM, equation (13) is solved for Y, with the resulting expression given by
equation (15).
Y, =
[X-U, -U„C, -U;,(1-5)C,_, -U,,e,]
U„
(15)
Next, equation (15) is used to substitute out for Y, and Y.^, in equation (14), and a solution
forC, is givenby equation (16).
C, = Od + a,C,., + a,C,^, + a,?, + a, e, + aje,,, (16)
Thea coefficients in equation (16) are defined as follows:
a„ =
(^-Uv)
yy
-pU,(l-5)-pU2y
a
(l-5)(^-UJ
U
yy (17)
where
9'!
yy
'yi: '•; , J! • ')C!' •
a, -i[-i3U,,(l-5)+''^ "'^ y ^^i'- ' "• • ' • (19)
yy
%•• •: • .T- - 'II
a, =
' n
• ^ 'a\' .* •- ' I !
-r:u,.u
(18)
' (20)
- TT 1 ' ' ^ ^ ^ .... • • :!:l
•' '' . J 1; f ... I [• , r
a4=^[-|^-UJ " " -• • • ' '• •• -(21)
• " " • ' • ' • • • (22)
" «• - .Uyy ..!
u' '• • ••• •;• 'puUr^a)'
^yy - • - - •-'yy .^ -
" '.>1. . ' •! . ! :
(23)
Note that a-, = Ba,. .The demand function given by equation (16) has a very generalized
form. It.can generate the demand for non-addictive goods as a special case with 5=1. In the
• ' • •- "... • , tr ^ : '' i , , I -
event that,5=0.^d the.intercept is suppressed, equation (16) reduces to the rational addiction
demand equation derived by BGM,with one difference. In.their theoretical model, they
suppress the,intercept.^ ^ ^
Consider equation (16) for the specialc^e that 6=1. This is the case of complete and
instant^epus depletion of ^e addictive stock in which ai=a2=a5=0. Thus, equation (16)
reduces to equation (24).
I- . I'"'0 .J . I • L'-'i' f. 'i • ' ♦ • . . . -
C, =a„+a,P,+5,e, • • . -i .. . •..|24)
' I
• . -'I ' tj,
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Equation (24) states that in the case of complete and instantaneous depreciation, the
dynamic demand equation for the good is independent of past and future consumption. In
other words, the model yields a demand equation for a non-addictive good as a special case
of the generalized model for addictive goods. If 6<1, the addictive stock does not decay
completely, and the demand for the addictive good is given by equation (16).' Current
microeconomic models require separate utility maximization problems to be specified in
order to derive the demandfor both addictive and non-addictive goods. This model provides
a single utility maximization problem for the derivation of an agent's demand functions
regardless of the addictive nature ofthe good. In addition, the addictive sub case of this
approach does not sacrifice the ability of the model to distinguish between myopic and
rational consumption patterns.
TheImpact ofAddiction Information on Cigarette Demand
BGM and Chaloupica assume that consumers are well aware ofthe addictive nature of
cigarettes. They then empirically test the hypothesis of whether consumers are myopic and
do not consider the future consequences of their actions (i.e., p=0) as opposed to being
rational or forward looking. They find empirical evidence to support their hypothesis of
rational addiction. In contrast, it is the premise ofthis paper that the revelation ofaddiction
information serves to make consumers aware of the implications of current consumption
decisions for future choices and, consequently, on future utility levels. In the absence of
addiction information about a good that is addictive, consumers have to rely on their past
consumption experience. They adjust their current consumption levels to maximize current
utility while compensating for the effects of tolerance, reinforcement and withdrawal due to
past consumption. HoweVer, the current assumption is that consumers do not account
explicitly for the effects of present consumption on fumre utility until they are informed that
the good is addictive. In other words, prior to receiving addiction information consumers act
11
in a manner consistent with a one-period utility maximization process subject to an addictive
stock constraint and a one-period budget constraint. When consumers are explicitly made
aware of the future consequences of current consumption, their behavior becomes consistent
• '.-/j / •, •
with a forward looking multi-period utility maximization process subject to an addictive
' i
stock constraint and a lifetime budget constraint.
The competing myopic and rational models of addiction can be reconciled under a
framework that considers the nature of addiction information available to agents. In this
smdy, agents are hypothesized to exhibit myopic behavior in the cohsumjption of addictive
goods when they are not explicitly informed of the addictive properties of the good. Once
they are told about the addictive nature of the good, agents ^e hypothesized to consider the
future implications of current consumption.
As in the case of BGM's model, our theoretical-model also has the ability to nest a
myopic model of addiction within a rational model. A forward looking agent who is
iconsuming an addictive good without the explicit information about; the effects of cunent
consumption on future utility is assumed to follow a one period static utility maximization
model: ! ' • - ' >
MmU(C,,A,,Y,,e,)
•subjecttOrA, = Y,j+PjC,,^d A,;=,(l-6)C,^i . .(25)
' ' ' . • 1 )• > li-'". 1 'iI'' ' '
••• '< • iVM- . . i,ri.
TTle corresponding Lagrangian is given by:
• •• ' •••'"• • ' • •••' '• I..-- -yr ,I , , ,
' ^=U(C,,(l-5)C,:,/Y,,e;i'+MAi'-Y. -CP.C,-}. '• • ' 'u . •..••..ic-- .-(26)
^ • --0 r ir., •
The associated first order conditions are:
UY^(C,,(l-5)C,^j,Y.,e,) =:i "
|1 !
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Uc,(C„(l-5)C,_„Y„e,) =X.P,. (28)
Given the quadratic utility function expressed in equation (12), equations (27) and (28) can
be solved in the same way as equations (13) and (14) to yield the following myopic demand
function:
c, =e„+e,c,_,+02P,+e,e,. - • • ,(29)
The 0 coefficients are defined as:
-[U.U„ +U„(X-U,)] (30)
[U„U„-UfJ ' •
0, =
-(1-5)[U„U„-U„U,,] (31)
[U„U„-Ufj
(32)
e, = [U„U„-U?,]
^ -[Ul.Uyy -UlyUyc] (33)
' [U,.U„-U?,]
If5=0 and the intercept is suppressed, equation (29) coincides with the BGM version
of amyopic demand function for an addictive good. The motivation for the BGM version of
the myopic model is that it is asub case of the rational addiction model given an agent with a
very high rate of time preference for the present (i.e., P=0). On the other hand, the version of
the rational addiction model in this paper posits that even agents with a low rate of time
preference for the present will exhibit myopic consumption behavior unless they are
explicitly informed about the future implications of current consumption of the addictive
good. In fact, we argue that adisclosure of information about the addictive properties of a
13
\S t I. It, ' \ ' • / ' r
good will prompt a switch in the pattern of consumption precisely because agents make
optimal use of all aydlable; information-^ V/hen agents become aware of the future
implications of currentconsumption of the addictive good, theywill adjusttheir consumption
pattemsto maximize their utility overseveral future timeperiods resulting in a switch from a
myopic to a rational pattern of consumption. Ourmodel can also be used to predict changes
. >
in the magnitude of coefficients of the demand equation. , ,. • ; •
^ . 5 ' —
Testable Implications of the Theory ' ^
A switch from a myopic to a rational demand function following the release of
addiction information is posited in this work. Hence, prior to the release of addiction
information, demand should take.the myopic form indicated in equation (29); and after the
•- " ' • • . ' I . i I I , , 1,' 1 '' I . 1. /. •
information is released, the demand function we observe should resemble the rational
,demand function in equation,(16). In.oAer words, when agents are unaware of the future
consequences of consuming an addictive good, their current quantity demanded is
independent of future consumption. However, when agents are aware of the additive nature
of a good then current and future consumption decisions ^e linked together.
To examine the direction and the magnitude of the changes of the coefficients when
-• 'i"' . -I •
agents switch from a myopic to a rational regime, it is useful to compare and contrast the
corresponding coefficients frpm.equations (16) and (29). In keeping with Chaloupka, it is
assumed that the. ainount of the addictive good consumed,and the amount of the addictive
: stock do not affect the m^ginal.utility of the composite, good.. In other words:
* ' *' ' ".'i . •
•; iit x' v-: -.n -.,3 , -re-, - •
Uw=U,^=0. '(34)
'• { , r-Mjhij'v .V ^ va./:;. ;.s-
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The Influence ofPast Consumption on Present Consumption
Using equations (34) and (23) to simplify equations (18) and (31), respectively,
yields:
(+) (+•)
-U,, (1-6)
a, =
' U„+ p U2,(1-6)^
(-) (+)(-) (+)
>0 (35)
(+) (+)
(36)
u„ • • •
(-) . .
Acomparison of(35) and (36) indicates that 0, is greater than a,. In other words, after the
release of addiction information when agents switch from myopic to rational consumption
patterns, the ability of a unit of last period's 'consumption to increase this period's
consumption declines.
The Influence ofFuture Consumption on Current Consumption
In amyopic model the effect of next period's consumption on current consumption is
nil because in a myopic model agents do not consider the future effects of current
consumption. In a rational model, however, future consumption does influence current
consumption. In keeping with BGM, the model developed in'this paper predicts that current
and future consumption will be adjacent complements (i.e., increases in current consumption
lead to increases in future consumption). This can be seen by examining the sign of the
coefficient on future consumption in equation (16). Using equation (34) to simplify equation
(19) yields:
;i5
,-.(+) (+) (+-) ... , ..
U,| +rp.U22(l-5)'^,; , .j. . ,, - ,,,
(-) (+)(-) (+)
The Influence'ofPrice'on Present Consumption'
' Dnce again, usiiig equations (34)"^d (23) to simplify the coefficients of price in the
myopic and rational^dernahd equations given by equations (33) and (20),'respectively, yields:
0, = —<0 (38)
•• U,V • "L. • :r- . • . • • ,
(-)
¥
=- 'j ....... ... -
(-) (+)(-) (+)
A comparison of equations (38) ^d (39) shows that in absolute value 02 exceeds, a^, The
model predicts that the'release of addiction infoirhationwhich-prompts'consumption pattems
to'switch from myopic to rational causes a d^penirig of the effect of-current price on.current
quantitydemanded.^^.t • ,
- -•'-Data '-••••- 'i- H,'.
The data set used in this-model-is comprisedof U.S; state disaggregated annual time-
series data for all theififty states and the District of Columbia for a-period of.il955rl994.
This data set essentially eictends the' data set ii'sed by'BGM by a-period' of nine years. The
data set is at the'per capita level-'with a total'of 1;989 potential observations. After
,n .
'L-
' 1 '• ',i , 1-1
^It can be easily shown that ihe iniercepts of both the rational and myopic demands, ccq and 0o, are positive although their
relative magnitudes cannot be determined. However^ because we'use cross-section time-series data in the empirical
work, the estimated intercepts may be picking up additional demographic and temporal effects. Hence, a discussion of
the intercepts in the theory section has been omitted.
16
eliminating observations due to missing sales and price data, the actual number of
observations is reduced to 1,925. The details of the states missing sales and price data are
contained inTable 1. A summary of variable definitions is presented in Table 2.
Consumption, C, , is measured by per capita tax-paid cigarette sales in packs. These
sales are reported for the fiscal year running from July 1to June 30. The data are compiled
by the Tobacco Tax Council (1996) and obtained by means ofa sample survey conducted in
all states and theDistrict of Columbia since 1954. Because theconsumption reported is for a
fiscal year, it spans approximately half of each oftwo consecutive calendar years. It is for
this reason that the price deflator used for calendar year t is a simple average of the 1982-
1984 consumer price index for all commodities for the years t-1 and t. This series is
published by the Council of Economic Advisors (1996). This price deflator is used to
convert all nominal prices and taxes to their corresponding real values.
Price. P, , for year t is measured by the average of the year t-1 and t average retail
prices reported by the Tobacco Tax Council. The state specific annual weighted average
price per pack is calculated by averaging over both the type of sale (i.e., single pack price,
carton price and vending machine price) and the different types of cigarettes sold (i.e.,
regular, king size, filter tip, etc.). This price is inclusive of state and federal excise taxes.
The state cigarette excise taxes that are used in the construction of the smuggling
variables are weighted averages constructed from the state cigarette excise taxes reported by
the Tobacco Tax Council for each fiscal year. The weights are the fractions of the fiscal year
for which each rate has been in effect.
The population figures for each state that are used in the construction of the
smuggling variables are taken from the Current Population Reports by the Bureau of Census
(various years). Although the theory does not explicitly consider the role of income, it is
included in the analysis for completeness in keeping with BMG. Income, INC,, for astate m
17'
• year t is measured by the average of the year:t^l and t state specific per capita .disposable
income. Thesefigures are takenfrom Ae Bureau of Economic Analysis (variolas years). .
Adjusting for Interstate Smuggling Bias ' •
Cigarette prices are given by average' retail prices per pack which, are inclusive of
state and federal taxes. As a result of significant differences in state excise taxes, there is a
financial incentive to smuggle cigarettes from lower-tax states to higher-tax states for resale
or consumption. Since per'capita consumption' is proxied by,per capita cigarette sales, it is
important to account for the impact of interstate smuggling on. per capita cigarette sales,, A
failure to do so would result in states with low cigarette excise taxes having overstated per
capita consumption and states with high cigarette excise taxes having understated per capita
cigarette consumption. According to Greene (1997), the omission of relevant (smuggling)
variables which are correlated with other regressors (state excise taxes that are contained in
average retail prices) will lead to biased arid inconsistent parameter estimates. .j
To constiiict proxies that capture the effects of interstate cigarette.smuggling, it is
useful to briefly describe the incentives for- the different types of cigarette smuggling that
exist.- BGM (1994) mention two different types of smuggling: short-distance and, long
distance smuggling. " Short-dist^ce smuggling, which is not illegal; refers to the actions of
cigarette consumers who live in high-tax states but purchase cigarettes in neighboring lower-
tax states for consumption at home.-- This'type of smvigglihg is only convenient for
consumers who live sufficiently close to the border of one or more, low-tax states. T^e
" behavior of these agents has also^been referred to as "casual smuggling" by Thursby and
Thursby (1994). BGM also describe a more organized illegal smuggling effort which they
term "long-distance smuggling."-''This refers to^the^ practice of organized attempts by
distributors to purchase cigarettes in the low-tax states of Virginia, North C^olina and
Kentucky and ship these'cigarettes to other states where counterfeit local tax stamps are
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attached and these cigarettes are sold at existing retail prices. Thursby andThursby refer to
this practice as "commercial smuggling." They provide an analysis of the economic
incentives that motivatecommercial smuggling. BGMdevise different proxies for both short
and long-distance smuggling. Because the data set used in this study is quite similar to
theirs, a detailed description of theirsmuggling proxy variables is in order.
Casual Smuggling
BGM proxy casual or short-distance smuggling using two different indices: SDTIMP
and SDTEXP. SDTIMP for the i"* state is defined as:
SDTIMPi =Xkij(Ti-Tj) (40)
j
In equation (40) state i is the state with the higher state tax rate, and state j is any bordering
state with a lower cigarette excise tax. SDTIMP proxies the incentive for agents in a higher-
tax state to cross the border and purchase cigarettes in a reasonably close lower-tax state.
Note that the simmiation is only taken over neighboring states with lower cigarette excise
taxes than the home state. ^ is the ratio of the number of people living in the higher-tax state
(state i) within a distance of twenty miles of the lower-tax state (state j) to the total
population of the higher-tax state (state i). These weights were computed from the 1990
Bureau of the Census' TIGER/Line (1995). T^ is the real state cigarette excise tax per pack in
the higher-tax state, and Tj is the real state cigarette excise.tax-per pack in the lower-tax state.
These tax rates are taken from the Tobacco Tax Council. Per capita consumption figures
based on in-state tax paid sales will be negatively related to SDTIMP because as the positive
tax differential between the home state and any, lower-tax neighboring state grows, more
consumers find it worth their time to cross the state line to purchase cigarettes. Thus, the per
capita sales in the high-tax state will fall. Per capita consumption in the high-tax state may
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••'stay the saiiie, but'more of the cig^ettes consumed^^wiil be -pittchased across the border.
Hence, the viable SDTIMP is included iii. the regression equation to-control for these
effects: • ' - ' . • vi- ' ).• •' --g ..
The incentives for a'lower-tax state :t6 be.a-casual exporter of^cigarettes are captured
• by the variable SDTEXP. • • ' • rj:\-
'' • -i' - " ' - -i • , ~
^ SDTEXPi =2^,kji(Ti-.Tj)P0Pj/P0Pi, , . (41)
j
• , 'I'j i' ' ' ! ] 'i' i ' I, • f'I , ' _ •' , I
In equation (41) statej is the higher-tax state, state i is the lower-tax state, and kjj is the ratio
of the number ofpeople living in the higher-tax state (state j) within.twenty miles of state i to
the. total population of state j .These ratios were also computed from, the Bi^eau of Census'
TIGER/Line. Note that the summation is only, t^en over neighboring states with higher
cigarette excise taxes than the home state^ -Tj is the^state^cigarette excise tax per pack in the
• higher-t^ state,.andTj is|theestate cigarette excise to per pack in the lower-tax state., The
border weights are multiplied .by the ratio of ^OPj, the.total populatipn of the people in the
higher-tax state, to POP,, the population of the peoplejn the lower-tax state... The product of
-.kji and (POPj/POP;) results in a ratio which^expresses Ae population of the higher-tax state
that lives within twenty miles of the lower-tax state as a fraction of the lower-tax state's total
population. The reasoning, behind, this weighting scheme is as follows. Ceteris paribus, a
V larger border-population in the high-tax state would potentially mean that more consumers
' ' ' 1 ' i . I - •. t • • I T .
would cross the border and purchase.cigarettes in the low-tax state. Thus, the fraction of per
• 'llll. r > -• r J I r I ^ ^ ^ f
capita sales in,a low-tax state attributable to across the. border customers would move in the
. same direction as,the across theborder population. However, a larger home population in the
low-tax, state rmght mean that a larger fraction of low-tax state per capita sales were
attributable to, purchases by. low-t^ state residents. Tlius, in order to compensate for these
competing effects, the tax differential be^een^the tyi^ states is weighted by the ratio ofthe
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across the bordertwenty milepopulation of the high-tax state to the population of the low-tax
state. Per capita consumption figures based on in-state tax paid sales will be negatively
related to SDTEXP because the across the border sales (and hence,' per capita sales in the
lower-tax state) will increase as the tax difference gets larger. However, the reason for the
negative sign is that this tax difference is expressed as a negative number. Ceteris paribus, as
the higher-tax state's tax rate increases or its border population increases, the fraction of per
capita sales inthe lower-tax state attributable to non-resident purchases increases. Hence, the
variable SDTEXP is included in theregression equation to compensate for these effects.
Commercial Smuggling
BGM proxy the effects of long-distance smugglmg on per capita sales via a single
index which picks up both commercial export and commercial import effects. Commercial
smuggling is done by cigarette sellers, and this is why purchase decisions by consumers in
high-tax states are independent of the tax differentials between their home st^e and the long
distance exporting states of Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina. This index, LDTAX, is
defined differently for the three states.
Commercial smuggling is undertaken for profit motives. BGM assume that it is only
profitable to smuggle cigarettes into states that, are within one thousand miles of Kentucky,
Virginia or North Carolina. States that are more than a thousand miles from Kentucky,
Virginia or North Carolina are assumed not to engage in commercial smuggling. In other
words, for states that are more than a thousand miles away from Kentucky, Virginia and
North Carolina, the variable LDTAX takes avalue ofzero. In addition to this, BGM assume
that all states that lie to the west of Kentucky with a higher cigarette excise tax rate than
Kentucky and within a thousand miles smuggle cigarettes in firom Kentucky. This
assumption makes sense because, of the three states, Kentucky lies farthest to the west.
Table 3 drives a detailed list of states that are recipients of cigarettes that are smuggled in
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from Kentucky and Virginia ^d North Carolina: The expression for LDTAX for the western
states within a thousand miles ofKentucky-is given.by equation (42). v ,, r
LDTAXi =(Ti-TKY) . _ J'-' . v' ^ '
' . r-; •. •'/ • 'ij";
Hence, the incentive for the i"* western state to smuggle cigarettes in from Kentucky is
proxied by the difference between the cigarette excise tax in state i and the cigarette excise
tax in Kentucky for the year in question. Per capita consumption figures based on in-state tax
paid sales will be negatively related to LDTAX because, of the following reasons. Ceteris
•I U . j 'f -1. • , . ; • .-^,7 - . •
paribus, as the tax differential widens, more andmore cigarettes will be smuggled into state i
' • • -' ' • • - O'' 11 * 11 1^,',' • • I'l I"' .
from Kentucky, and the share of domestic sales in per capita consumption in state i will
decline. If the tax rate in state i is lower than the tax rate in Kentucky, it is assumed that no
» . . , .1 ^ '
cigarettes are imported from Kentucky, and LDTAX is set to zero for that state.
BGM also assume that Virginia and North Carolina share the' amount of cigarettes
that are commercialiy smuggled into all states that lie to their northeasfand southeast and are
also within five hundred miles of North Carolina and Virginia. The expression for the
LDTAX variable for these states is givenby equation (43)." '
' ••LDTAX/=Z^,Ci:^T^^)-f-Zv^ei^-Tv^^ ^ ^ wr ... • (43)
• i;. f' - i
•Equation (43) indicates, that in any state i with a higher tax rate than either North Carolina or
' i-' • • - -I- ,
Virginia.or both, smuggling occurs,from either one or both states. If the tax rate in state i is
- ' l.J C- • . I , i''- . . ;
. lower .than the tax rate in-an exporting state (i.e.,.North Carolina or Virginia), it is assumed
that no cigarettes are imported from that state, and the tax differential between state i and the
* r k'
exporting state is set to zero. The proportion of the cigarettes smuggled in from either North
^.Carolina or Virginia into state i is proxied by the sum of the. weighted tax differentials
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between the cigarette excise taxes in state i and those of North Carolina ^d, Virginia,
respectively. The weights ZNc-and Zva are given by equations (44) and (45), respectively.
(Value added inNC) •
(Valueadded in NC+Value addedin VA)
(Value added in VA)
(Valueadded in NC+Value addedin VA)
These weights are the ratios of the value-added from tobacco produced in each state
to the sum of the value-added from tobacco production in both states. Thevalue-added from
tobacco production in each state was determined by taking an average over the years 1955-
1964. Data for these years were obtained from Creek, Capehart and Grise (1994). Data for
later years were not available. Once again, the sign ofthe variable ofLDTAX is predicted to
be negative for reasons similar to those discussed previously. Ceteris paribus, as the tax
differential ^widens, more and more cigarettes will be smuggled into state i from North
Carolina and/or Virginia and the share of domestic sales in per capita consumption in state i
I j
will decline.
Now we examine how to account for the impact of commercial smugglmg activities
on the per capita sales of the states of Kenmcky, Virginia and North Carolina. The LDTAX
variable is also used to adjust per capita sales in Kentucky to reflect that a certain proportion
of in state purchases are actually smuggled across the border and are not consumed in the
state ofKentucky. The expression for LDTAX for the state ofKentucky is given by equation
• (46).
LDTAX,, =X(Tkv-Tj):^
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Note that'the summation is taken over all potential,importing, states j that have a higher
cigarette excise tax-^than Kentucky. The-tax differential between,-Kentucky ^d. state j is
weighted by the ratio of the population of state j to that of.Kentucky. This is presumably
because a larger tax differential will prompt more commercial smuggling ofcigarettes from
Kentucky to state j. Alarger population of state j (POPj )will perhaps lead to a larger market
for smugglers to cqXgt to while, ceteris paribus^ a larger population of the state of Kentucky
•'(POPkv) might mean that a larger fraction of per capita^Kentucky cigarette sales,are actually
consumed in Kentucky. • . - . . •; ' ' - , • •
The LDTAX variable for North Carolina and Virginia is.,calculated in a very similar
fashion to that ofKentucky. The formulas for the computation of the LDTAX variable for
the state ofNorth Carolina andVirginia aregivenby equations (47) and (48).,
LDTAXnc = Z„r'NC
LDTAXva = Z'VA
S-(T,c-V
POP;
POPNC
- POR
POPvA-J r.f, . "f) ' ' ^ ,•
' . (47)
^ . (48)
Equations (47) and (48) are quite similar to equkion (46), but they are different in that they
are weighted by the value-added ratios given in equations (44) and (45). The reason for the
• ^
value-added weighting is the assumption that North C^olina and Vurginia share the amount
of the commercial cigarettes smuggled into the northeastern and southeastern states. For a
J . • • J • ' :
complete listof these states refer toTable 3. The reasoning for thepopulation ratio weighted
tax differentials is the same as thatexplained above for the state o'fKentucky. Theper capita
consumption variable based on in-state tax paid sales is negatively related to LDTAX for
Kentucky, Virginia and North^Carolina because,.the amount of^cigarettes smuggled out of
these states should vary in the s^e direction as the positive gap in taxes between the
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importing state and the low-tax exporting state. However, the tax differential is always a
negative number because it is the lower-tax state's tax minus the higher-tax state's tax. Thus,
the predicted sign of LDTAX' is negative for the three long-distance commercial exporting
states.
Econometric Model and Procedures
One of the main objectives of this model is to test whether the release of addiction
information in 1979 impacted the pattem ofcigarette consumption in-any significant way. In
this study it is hypothesized that-in the absence ofaddiction information, agents will exhibit
myopic consumption pattems. However, once they are given information on the addictive
properties of'the good, they will switch to rational pattems of consumption. As explained
previously, such aswitch in consumption pattems is evidenced by achange in the magnitude
of the coefficients of past consumption, future consumption and price in the demand
equation. Moreover, this switch in consumption pattems implies that future consumption
becomes asignificant variable in the post-information demand function. For convenience, the
myopic demand function from equation (29) and the rational demand fimction from equation
(16) are reproduced here as equations (49) and (50).
c, =eo+e,c,_,+02P,+e3e, (49)
' C, =a„+a,C,',+a3C,„+a,P,+a4e,+a5e,,, (50)
Because myopic demand is asub case of the rational addiction demand function, the
hypothesized structural changes in the demand function can be easily operationahzed as
follows. Equation (50) can be modified to include a dummy viable INFO which, if
significant, will alter the magnitudes of the post-information era regression coefficients.
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INEO takes on a value-of zero ;for.any year.prior to, 1979 and a,value, of one for the years
.1979 and beyond. This modified specification is giyen by eqimtion (5,1):
C, =.'no +(Tli +y|INFO)C,_, +(ri2 +.y2lNF0)C,^, +('n3 +y,INFO)P, +s,. (51)
The operationalization of equation (50) can be explained succinctly if the right hand side of
equation (51) is multiplied out.
" • "+ri3P;+73'(INFO*P,) +sr' . .(52)
In"equation (52) tHe impacfof each right hand side variable is split into two parts.
The T|'s" show the impact of the variable'on consumption prior to the release of addiction
information, anU the sum'of the Corresponding ti's and y's show the impact of the same
'li '"ill'' i' f". ' ' • ' . I I , r." ' . ,
variables after the release of addiction information. 8 is the error term generated by the
absence of the unobservables e, and e,+, in the regression equation. The predicted signs of the
y's will be inferred based upon the hypothesis of a switch from a myopic to a rational model.
''Vi : i.f ',r••' , ... •: •. ,
The pre-information and post-information coefficients are summarized in Table 4.
A switch from a myopic demand function of the form depicted in equation' (49) to a
rational demand function shoAvn in equation (50) has the following implications for the y's.
According to equations (35) and (36), 0i is greater thana,. Hence, the predicted sign ofyj is
negative. Similarly, from equations (38) and (39) it is apparent that exceeds Gj. Thus, the
' r '' I ' ' ' r i'/'l I .
predicted sign of y, is positive. Finally, since Ct^, is not included in the myopic model hs
coefficient in the pre-information years is zero. In other words, if the hypothesis ofmyopia
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in the pre-information era is accurate, TI2 in equation (52) will not be significantly different
from zero. However, in the post-information years the coefficient of C,+, (TI2+ Y2) in the
rational demand equation is predicted to be positive. This prediction is based on equation
(37) where is signed positive. Hence, in the post-information years the predicted sign of
72 is positive.
Several additional variables are added to equation (52) resulting with a final
regression equation given by (53). To control for the effects of both casual and commercial
smuggling, the variables capturing the tax differential (SDTIMP,, SDTEXP, and LDTAX,)
are included with the predicted signs of the corresponding coefficients (114, qj and r\^) all
being negative. For completeness, post-information era structural breaks are also specified
for the smuggling variables although we cannot posit anything about the significance or signs
of these breaks from the theory of rational addiction. In keeping with BGM, annual state
specific per capita disposable income, INC,, along with its post-information era structural
break are also included. Once again the theory does not predict a structural break in income,
but nonetheless, one is specified for completeness. Asummary ofthe expected signs ofthese
coefficients is given in Table 5.
%
c, =T1„+T1,C,.,+y,(INFO*C,.,) +r|,C„,+Y2(INFO*C„,)
+r|3P, +YjCINFO *P,) +Tl4lNC, +V4(INF0 *INC,) +TI5SDTIMP,
+y5(INFO *SDTIMP,) +n^SDTEXP, +yjCINFO*SDTEXP,)
+Tl7LDTAX,+y, (INFO* LDTAX, )+s, (53)
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Because the data set consists of state-specific time-series, a.fixed effects model that
employs state-specific-andiannual dummies-is used. This-is in keeping with the procedure
- used by BGM who'employed a.similar data-set. The annual dummies pick up,the yearly
effects of health information and the recent media coverage of the tobacco industry, while the
'state dummies compensate for the diversity:in demographic composition, rincome and other
' state specific'variables that may be correlatedwith cigarette consumption. >
Another• similarity in the estimation with;BGM,arises:from the.factithat-the variables
' C,.i and Cj^i in equation-(53?) are endogenous.' As BGMipointout; ,the.endogeniety becomes
• apparent when the dependence of C,;, on.e, in the first order conditions given byiequations
(10) ^^d (M)^is^explored.i'-Eurthenriore, they reject :the null, hypothesisi'o.f]ponsistent OLS
estimates'attheonepercent.level usingaDe-MinWufFrtest. , . p ' /. • •
•A potential'solution to'the.endogeneity problem will involvefestimating C,., and 0,+,
using ^various instrumental variables;. Sonie of.ithese .instruments may be lagged ^d lead
values of prices and taxes, jIn .keeping with BGM,several different sets,of.instruments will
be used. In general, two different sets of instruments'are available. The-fonner cpntains.bpth
lag and lead values-of prices and taxes as instruments while the latter, contains pnly the lag
values ofprices'and'taxes;-.-f, , . ..-.j . • , ,
' " BGM' favor'the sets of instruments that use both the lag and lead values of the,price
.^d tax variables. •They^e opposed to.using instrument sets that omit future prices and taxes
' because they^maintain that future prices and taxes ^e.good indicatorsjof future consumption.
They siaie that 'cigarette tax hikes are.publicized .in-advance thereby giving consumers ,a fair
idea about future prices. They argue that,to omit the one period lead values of prices and
taxes from the set of instruments might lead:to la loss,of valuable infonnation. Furthemiore,
they claim that the lagged values of prices and taxes are not goodpredictors of future prices.
However, BGM admit that if consumers have poor forecasts of future prices, the forecast
error in future price will create a downward bias in the coefficient of future consumption.
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Finally, they argue that another reason to use future prices and taxes as, instruments is that
models that use these instruments are much less sensitive to changes in the specification of
the structural demand equation. Thus, regressions using both-sets of instruments will be
considered.
The different combinations of lag and lead prices and taxes used by BGM are
replicated, along with all the other explanatory variables. There are four different sets of
instrumental vmables labeled models (i) through (iv) that are used to estimate equation (53).
The details of the different sets of instrumental variables are contained in.Tables 6 and 7. In
the context of these tables, the variable T, refers to annual state cigarette excise tax per pack
and Pt refers to the average retail price per pack. Table 6contains both lead and lag values of
the price and tax instruments used. Table 7 contains only those instrumental variable
combinations that do not use any lead values of prices or taxes. In addition to the various
leads and lags ofprices and taxes, each set ofinstruments also contains all other explanatory
variables in the^model. The estimation procedure used is instrumental"variable. Model (v) is
just an OLS estimation of equation (53).
Another ^concern is the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. BGM
computed avariance-covariance matrix that was adjusted for the effects of serial correlation^*
They clmm that the corrected standard errors were not very different from the standard errors
that were obtained without the correction. They also used weighted least squares to correct
for the effects ofany heteroscedasticity that may have been present. Once again; they report
that their results do not change significantly. Since the data set that is used here is essentially
an extension of the BGM data the concerns.regarding serial correlation and heteroscedasticity
.have already been addressed by the analysis performed by BGM.
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' • .Results- ' vr." ---r.. , •
In keeping with BGM; equatioh'<53):was estimated.using ordinary least squares and
the seven diffei^entsets of-instruments >that are outlined, in Tables 6 and 7,LiiJhe results ^e
' presented in Tables 8 through 11. -It'should beinoted thatstate and annual dumrny yariabies
^e included in the estimation of allithe modds.but^not reported in thcrtables. Hovveyer, the
• estimates of these intercepts are reportedand-discussed by Fenn.:,-' ; . r„/
- Regressions'that Use Bbth'Lag arid Lead Instruments
I
Table 8 presents the:regression coefficients.T|j'through' T|7 and y,= through Y7 of equation
•(53).' Theestimates in columns (i)'through (iv) correspond to.instrument sets.(i) through (iv),
respectively, as described in Table 6. Column, (v) gives the ordinary least.squ^es estimates.
' •The corresponding R^-statistic, the 'sample sizeiN,: and the .asymptotic twortaUed t-ratio
' accompanying eachicoefficient are also»reported. .-j '.i >
' ' ' :Using the results in-Table-8,'the prerinformation andipostrinformatipn coefficients for
equation (53) a^e computed in accordance^with the procedures-outlined in.Table 4 ^d are
reported in Table 9.'-.The R^ statistic is carried over/.from :thespreyipus table. Table,9^also
"reports the estimates of the time-preference parameter/P;.and its corresponding real interest
rate r/which will be discussed later in the paper. .1' - •'/» j ^
A systematic perusal-of Table 9' allows bnejitd graspsthe iniplicatipns of the
econometric results for the theory. The left half of the table gives the estimates,of the
demand equation parameters'in the prerinformationi^years/(pre-1979: coefficients), and the
right half of the table-give's thej parameters of the demand equation pertinent to the post-
information'years'(post-r979 coefficients);'.'Once again,', the .coefficients in any particular
column correspond to the estimates obtained by using ithe.set of instruments indicated by; the
column number. '4, • l • ^
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In the pre-information years the estimates of the coefficient ofpast consumption (tIi)
range from 0.445 to 0.557, and in the post-inforaiation years the estimates ofthe coefficient
ofpast consumption (tIi-h/,) range from 0.261 to 0.491. These estimates are .all positive in
sign and significant at the one percent level. Thus, the results show that past consumption is
a positive and-significant variable both in the pre-information and in the post-information
years. These findings support the theoretical prediction of a positive coefficient on past
consumption for an addictive good.
In the pre-information years the estimates of the coefficient of future consumption
(TI2) range from 0.013 to 0.437. These estimates are also always positive in sign. In the pre-
information years, with the exception ofthe OLS estimate reported in column (v), none of
the coefficient estimates of future consumption are significantly different from zero at the
one percent level of significance. In.other words, the results suggest that agents are myopic
in the pre-information period. In the post-information years the estimates of the coefficient
of future consumption (TI2+T2) range from 0.328 to 0.429. These estimates are all positive in
sign and statistically significant at the one percent level. With the exception of the OLS
estimates, the results show that future consumption becomes a signific^t variable in the
post-information years, whereas it is not significant in the pre-information years. These
results support the hypothesis maintained in this study that agents are myopic in the pre-
information period due to a lack of information, but become rational after the release of
addiction information.
The estimates ofthe coefficient of price are all negative and significant at the one
percent level. They range from -34.886 to -10.833 in the pre-information period and from
-23.122 to -7.365 in the post-information period. For each set of instruments, they decrease
in absolute value between the pre-information and the post-information period. These
findings support the theoretical prediction ofanegative coefficient on price in both periods.
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'Furthermore, they support.the prediction that the coefficient of price injthe post-information
periodwill be smallerin absolute.value thanits pre-information counterpart.
' The estimates of the"coefficient of income! range from .0.061 to 0.227 in the pre-
information period and are all significant at the;one percent level, except,for the OLS case
which is significant at-the five percent level. However;-in the ppst-informatipn period the
estimates of the coefficient of income,jwith the exception ofthe OLS .estiniate, are negative
in sign. In tlus period, they are also not significantly different from zero, at the ,fiye percent
level. Thus, in' general, with the-exception, of the OLS:case; ,the coefficient of income
appears to switch signs and lose significance inthe post-information period; The theory.does
not make any predictions about the magnitude or the significance of the coefficient of
income. • /n i- • • -'l . -
The coefficients of the three, smugglmg. indices are ,all negative in, sign in both
periods. With the exceptionof a coupleofOLSestimates, they are also always significant at
the one percent level!-The; structural breaks in.the estimates-jof the coefficients (y^ andy^)of
the casual smuggling indices SDTIMP, and,LDTAXj reported in Table 8 are not significantly
different from zero at the'five percent, significance leveL.r However, the estimates of the
coefficients of the commercial smuggling index SDTEXP,.dp exWbit a significant structural
breaks. This results'in an increase iniabsolute value of the coefficient of Ae commercial
smuggling index SDTEXP, between the pre-information and .the .post-information period.
Because these indices .are-not'considered in the.theoretical,model, there ^e no a priori
•expectations about the magnitudes ,or; signs of the icoefficients of the structural breaks for
these variables. . ^ - l"'-. ^ i -m,] , . . -
- V• In general,vthe.y coefiEicientsare:signific^t as a group.,,The.null hypp^esis of all the
Ycoefficients being zero.is-rejected atl.the one percent leyel of significance for models (i)
through (iv). The calculated Frstatistics. for these models (i) through,(iy) are: 5.59, 7.31,
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8.31 and 7.03, respectively. The large F-statistics merely reconfirm the significance of the
presence ofstructural breaks indicated by the large t-statistics for individual ycoefficients.
The regression results fi-om Table 9 hold several imphcations for the theory. The
coefficient of past consumption always enters the regression equation with, a positive sign.
This is in keeping with the notion that a higher level of past consumption will spur an
increase in current consumption for an addictive good. "Hiis coefficient is positive and
significant in both the pre-information and the post-information periods. Thus, the
regressions support the theoretical notion of the.addictiveness of nicotine regardless of the
availability of addiction information. These results provide empirical evidence that is
consistent with the notion that cigarettes are addictive.
The coefficient of future consumption is not significantly different from zero in the
pre-information period. However, in the post-information period itis positive and significant
at the one percent level. This-lends credibility to the hypothesis that once consumers are
explicitly informed ofthe future consequences of consuming an addictive good, their current
choices do reflect a consideration of the impact of those choices ontheir fixture satisfaction.
In other words, in the absence of addiction information, consumers tend to make myopic
consumption choices, but once informed of the addictive nature of the good, they make
optimal use of all available information in that they display an explicit consideration of the
future impact of current consumption.
Aperusal of the estimates of the coefficient of price suggests that an increase in the
price per pack of cigarettes would lead to a decline in the per capita consumption of
cigarettes both in the pre-information and in the post-information period. However, in the
post-information period the decline in the absolute value of the price coefficient estimates for
all sets of instruments indicates that after the addictive properties of nicotine are disclosed, a
price cut loses some of its sales generating ability. In other words, cigarette consumers who
are not aware of the addictive properties of nicotine are likely to increase consumption by a
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greater amount in response to a price cut than if they, were aware of the addictive, aspects of
nicotine. A given rise in prices due to an increase in cigarette, taxes would not generate as
large a decrease in consumption In the: post-information period as it would in the pre-
information period. Thus, the results seem to imply that the efficacy, of cigarette taxes as a
•deterrent is mitigated by the presence of addiction information. j:.. - • "
The two-stage least squares estimates of the coefficient on•income suggest that
cigarettes switch from normal to slightly inferior.or income neutral good after the disclosure
of the addictive properties ofnicotine. Inother words, a rise in income,for a consumer in the
pre-informatioh'period will be accompanied.-by.'an .increase .in .iper capita cigarette
consumption, whereas a rise in income'for a consumer inthe post-rinformation period will be
^ accompanied bya slight decrease inper capita cigarette.consumption.:^
The estimates of' the coefficients .of all the ;smuggling indices are negative and
' significant in both the pre-information and the post-information time periods. These findings
-'suggest that both casual and commercial smuggling were prevalent inboth time periods. The
only estimates that display a structural break between the two periods are theestimates of the
variable SDTEXP. • i:'- I. • ;. < •
The empirical results support the theory quite strongly..The two-stage least squares
results'are not sensitive to the choice of instruments specified,in Table,,6. .The hypothesized
shift from a myopic to^a rational patternof consumption is observed. In the post-infonnation
period the magnitude of the impact ofpast consumption on current.cqnsumption is predicted
to decline ahd this is supported'by the-negative sign on the,estimates of y, for all sets of
' instruments Table 8. Furthermore; the prediction of a drop in-the power of price,to stimulate
consumption in the post-information period-is supported by a positive sign on the estimates
bfy, for all sets of instruments in Table 8. "
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Regressions Using Only Lag Instruments
In keeping with BGM, a second series of regressions was run .using instrumental
variables that excluded any lead values of prices and taxes. The instrument sets are
designated (vi) through (viii) and are described in detail in Table 7. The results from these
regressions are presented inTable 10. The pre-information and post-information coefficients
are represented in Table 11.
The results from this second set of regressions are less favorable. The pre-
iriformation estimates are the most troublesome.- The estimates' of the coefficient of past
consumption are negative but insignificant; the price coefficient estimates are positive and
significant in two out of three regressions. In addition, the estimates of the coefficients of
each of the casual smuggling indices (SDTIMP, and SDTEXP,) are negative, in only one out
of three regressions while the estimated coefficient of the commercial smuggling index
(LDTAX,) is always positive. However, these, regressions do offer some support for the
model in that the pre-information period estimates of the coefficient of-future consumption
are positive and significant in all three regressions.
The post-information coefficients do offer lunited support for the theory. While the
estimates of the coefficients on both past and future consumption are always positive and
significant, the estimates of price are negative and significant in only two out of three
regressions. The estimates of the coefficients of each of .the casual smuggling-indices still
have the wrong signs in the majority of the regressions.
BGM had similar problems with the second set of regression instruments as well.
However, they argue that any set of instruments that attempts to predict future consumption
without aconsideration of future prices or taxes is inherently flawed, and as such, not much
weight should be placed on the resuhs of these regressions. This is because they are based on
incomplete sets of instruments.
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Estimates of the Restricted Rational Addiction Model with Structural Breaks
The'time preference p^ameter-P is the.-rate at which _the agent discpunts, the
contribution of a future period's utility to the, sum .of; the present discounted value of the
utility stream, p can be recovered from.theicoefficientsiof the regression equation. In any
p^icular regression equation it is given by the ratio .of the icoefficient,of future consumption,
, to the coefEibient ofpast consumptionv-Gn/as can be.seen;by examining.equations (18)
and (19). • • ' " • ' ' '• -
Tables 9 and 1Talso report the time preference parameter p and its associated interest
rate. r. In Table 9 (the'regressions with. both lag and lead instruments) the two-stage least
squares'estimates ofthe pre-information p.range from 0.026; to 0.237 and;Ae corresponding
interest rates r^ge from 3693 to 322.7 percent. These values ofPare implausibly low, while
the accompanying interest rates are implausibly high::-! In contrast,-the post-information
estimates ofp are implausibly high. They range from .1.105 to. 1.258, and the corresponding
interest rates range from -9.5 percent to -20.5 percent. In Table 11 the two-stage least
squares estimates of the pre-informatibn p. range, from-'.-89.631 to -2.456 and the
corresponding interest rates range from -101;percerit.tOi-140.7 percent. The post-information
estimates of p riige froni 0.775 to 0.925 ^d the corresponding interest rates range from 29
percent to 8.r percent. Apart'from these last estimates, the.estimates of .p, in general, are
troubling because they either-imply interest' rates that-are too high or they, imply negative
interest rates. The interest rates obtained by'these regression.estirnates cast suspici9n on the
robustness of the model'. BGM also admit to haVirig a model:which does not produce very
plausible estimates of the time preference'parameter p and, consequently, of the red interest
rate r.
• To investigate the robustness of their model, BGM, re-estimate Aeir model with
values of p-fixed at plausible'levels.' Since the. results'from. Table 9 show that the rational
addiction model with structural breaks suffers frbmithe. problem of high interest rates in the
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pre-information period and negative interest rates in the post-information period, the model
was re-estimated using values of p fixed at more plausible values.. Only model (iv) was re-
estimated, and the results are reported in Table 12.
The basic findings that are reported inTable 9 remain unaltered by the imposition of
different values of P ranging from 0.75 to 0.95. These values of ,p correspond to interest
rates of0.33 and 0.05, respectively. As the results inTable 12 show, there is still a shift from
amyopic to arational pattern ofconsumption after the release ofaddiction information. The
influence of past consumption on'current consumption•gets stronger after the release of
addiction information. The influence of price on current consumption declines in the post-
information period compared to its influence on consumption in the pre-information period.
The smuggling indices retain their negative signs as predicted by the theory. In essence, the
imposition of reasonable discbunt factors does little to undermine the empirical support for
the rational addiction model with structural breaks.
Updated Empirical Results from the BGM Rational Addiction Model
To contrast BGM's rational addiction model to ours which includes structural breaks,
we will re-estimate the rational addiction model without structural breaks using the updated
data set developed for this study. The estimates from the regressions run on this model using
the instrumental variables described in Tables 6 and 7 are reported in Tables 13 and 14,
respectively. In keeping with the empirical findings in BGM, the regressions that use both
lag and lead instruments (columns (i) through (iv) in Table 13) provide more support for the
rational addiction model than the regressions that exclude ftiture pnces and taxes as
instruments (columns (vi) through (viii) in Table 14).
• The regressions-'labeled (i) through (iv) in Table 13 support the hypotheses that
cigarette consumers are rational by the presence of.positive estimates of the coefficient of
friture consumption. Furthermore, the positive estimates, of the coefficient of fiiture
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- consumption provide.support for the hypothesis that cigarettes.are>^^addictive-good. .The
- negative estimates oii the coefficient of,price also support the theoretical predictions about
-the impact of price on current^consumption. However, the coefficient of income is negative
' in two out of four regressions,-whereas for the empirical results ofBGM,which employs data
from 1955-1985,- the estimates of the coefficients of income are positive for all sets of
instruments'. The coefficients of the smuggling indices have the predicted negative signs. ,
• One of the problems .with the rational addiction model proposed by BGM is that the
estimates of (3 inferred from-the two-stage least squares estimates in Table 13 ^e implausibly
low. They range from 0.34 to 0.90. In tum, these low values of p imply implausibly high
values of the interest rate ranging from abput 60 percent to 198 percent.
• The regressions-'labeled,(vi) through (viii) in Table, 14r^e also problematic for the
BMG; rational addictionmodel.'j'As is the case with the empirical-model used in this study,
j some estimates of the coefficient of past consumption are negative, and one estimate of the
coefficient of future consumption is insignificantrat-the, five percent level. In two put of the
' three regressions, price has a negative coefficient.' As BGM poinVout, these aberrations are
"• probably-attributable to the use'ofan incomplete set of instrumental variables.
Although the.BGM model does not specifically account for,the impact of addiction
" information on cig^etterconsumption, the'empirical results from their model do have some
commonalties with .theempirical ,> results- of the model, deyeloped,in this ,study which
incorporates structural bre^s. For the sake of brevity, .comparisons ^d^contrasts will only
be made across the.regressions that, use future prices.and-taxes-as,instruments. .In other
words; the results from Table 9 willbe compared to those,in Table-13.
. In general, both sets.of results show that the. tyvo models agree,on the signs of all the
explanatory, ^variables except .for->income. . However,;, for each-explanatory variable in the
current smdy,' there-is -a pre-information and.; a ppstrinfonnation -coefficient. With the
exception ofincome, the signs ofall these variables in both the pre-information and, the post-
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information period agree with the signs of the corresponding variables in the BGM results.
A comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients on the-price, income and consumption
variables reveals an interesting fact. The estimate of eachof the.aforementioned coefficients
from the BGMmodel is bounded by the corresponding pre-information and post-information
in the current model. Forexample, in Table 13 the regression (i) estimate of the coefficient
onpast consumption inthe BGM model is 0.517. This figure isbounded by 0.557 and 0.312,
the conesponding estimates of the coefficient of past consumption from regression (i) in
Table 9. This suggests that addiction information does' have an explicit role to play in the
demand equation.
The BGM model is generally on the right track, but a model that accounts for the
dissemination of addiction information provides more accurate estimates of the coefficients
ofthe explanatory variables in the demand equation. This difference is most apparent in the
case of the coefficient on future consumption. TheBGM model predicts that agents account
for the future impact of addiction information even without the knowledge that a good is
addictive. For example, in Table 13 regression (iv) has an estimate of 0.188 for the
coefficient offuture consumption which is significant at the one percent level. However, the
rational addiction model with structural breaks demonstrates the following. When addiction
information is explicitly included in the demand equation, then in fact, agents who do not
know that cigarettes are addictive do not consider the future impact of current consumption.
For example, in Table 9 regression (iv) has an estimate of 0.056 for the pre-information
coefficient of future consumption which is not significantly different from zero at the five
percent level. The structural break model hypothesizes that agents only consider the future
impact of current consumption after they are made aware of the addictive properties of
nicotine. For example, the estimate of the post-information coefficient on fiiture
consumption from regression (iv) in Table-9 is 0.347, and it is significant at the one percent
level.
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.Conclusions >
The model constructed in this.paper empirically'modifies the rational addiction.model
to allow for the possibility of^structural changes in the demand,function which,may have
occurred-beginning in 1979 due to.the release.of addiction information. It reconcUes. the
competing models of myopia and rationality by accounting for the availability of addiction
information to consumers. In addition to this, the theoreticaLmodel generalizes the rational
addiction model to include non-addictive goods. "This innovation nests the demand for both
addictive and non-addictive goods as sub cases of aisingle demand equation. The subsequent
rational addiction-demand equation thatis derived from this model retains.the ability to
distinguish between rational and myopic behavior. This-model provides testable implications
concerning the addictive nature-of a> good. -It predicts that due.to the addictive nature of
cigarettes, past consumption will influence the level of current consumption regardless of the
availability of addiction information. It also- provides testable unplications about myopic
•versus rational consumption'pattems. S^pecifically,-the, theoretical, model predicts, that the
impacts of past consumption arid'price oni current consumption will decline after^the release
•ofaddiction information. It also predicts that future consumption,will-become a, significant
determinant'in^the post-information rational .demand equation., •
The model was tested using U.S. annual state disaggregated time-series data from
1955-1994. The data^set is essentially an updated version of.that used by BGM. The
empirical estimation of the model accounts' for the effects of casual and commercial
smuggling due-to-diverse state cigarette excise tax.rates,-This is done, by including indices
that capture the incentives to smuggle cigarettes into ^d-out ofeach state. -
Several different regressions .were run.> They ,c^ be broadly classified into four, sets.
The first set ofregressions estimates the rational addiction model with structural breaks using
sets of instruments that contain both lag. and lead values of cigarette prices and taxes. The
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second set repeats the estimation using sets of instruments that contain only lag values of
cigarette prices and taxes. A third set of regressions using different reasonable fixed values
of the time preference parameter is estimated because the estimates obtained from the first
two sets of regressions yield implausible estimates of the time preference parameter. The
fourth set of regressions estimates a rational addiction model without any structural breaks
overthe entire sample. This is essentially anupdated version of the BGM regressions.
The results from the empirical analysis support the theory quite strongly. There is a
significant structural break in the coefficients of past consumption, future consumption and
price which occurs in the year that information regarding the addictive aspects of cigarettes
was released by the Surgeon General. The data are consistent with a myopic model in the
pre-information period and a forward looking rational model in the post-information period.
The results suggest that agents who are not explicitly informed ofthe future consequences of
cigarette smoking do not consider the impact of current choices on their future well being.
However, agents that are explicitly informed about the future implications ofconsuming an
addictive good do consider the impact of current consumption on future choices when
determining the amount of current consumption. In addition to the switch from amyopic to a
rational pattern of consumption, the results also support theoretical predictions of the
direction and magnitude of the structural breaks in the coefficients of the key variables. The
data support the notion that in the absence of addiction information past consumption and
price will have a Larger impact on current consumption than in the presence of this
information. These findings concur with the logic that when consumers know about the
future impact of current consumption they modify their current consumption levels to ensure
that they maximize their well being not only in the current time period but also in the future.
The data suggest that this modified behavior mitigates the effects of past consumption and
prices on current consumption levels. The implication for using cigarette taxes as apolicy
tool is that cigarette consumption by consumers who are aware of the addictive nature of
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nicotine will respond less to a tax hike than the cbnsumptidn levels of those consumers who
are unaware of the addictive "properties of nicotine. The model, is robust to exogenously
imposed time preference rates. The results are not sensitive choices of the set of
instruments given that future values of prices and taxes ;are, ^ed to predict future
consumption. . . , , •
The theoretical model developed in this work and the empirical results suggest a
number of avenues for further research. Because our model introduces the depreciation rate,
5, as a factor in the addiction process, this depreciation rate could be examined as a choice
variable. For example, 6 could have been manipulated by tobacco firms by changing the
level of nicotine in cigarettes to make them more or less addictive. A^lso, the availability of
low tar and nicotine cigarettes could make 8 a choice viable; for the consumer. Or
consumersmay be uncertainabout the value of 8 or perceivedifferent values of 8 depending
on information about the addictive nature of nicotine.
Finally, this model estimates the impact of addiction information on cigarette
consumption after 1979. However, this information was available to the Brown and
Williamson Tobacco Company as early as 1962. Another direction for future research would
be to use the demand equation from the current model to examine the welfare implications
for consumers of the release of addiction information at the initial date of discovery.
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Table 1.. ;States with Missing Data
State
"Al^ka
Hawaii ' • •
California
Colorado
Maryland
Missouri
North Carolina'
Oregon
"Virginia
•Ye^s with Missing Data
1955-1959 •• • •
1955-1960 : - '
1955-1959 -• 1
-1955-1964 .
1955-1-958
- ^ 1955 - -
1955-1969
1955-1966 -
•1955-1960 .
Variable
. '.'Jl
C.
Pt
-•INC, ,
SDTIMP-,
SDTEXP,
LDTAX,
INFO
T
POP;
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
Description
Per capitacigarette consumption in packs in fiscal year t as obtained
from'state cigarette excise tax-paid sales.
Average retail price ofyear t and t-1 as reported inNovember of each
year in 1982-84 dollars.
;Ayerage of per capita incomein year t ^d t-1 in 1982-84 dollars.
Indexwhichmeasures casual (import) smuggling incentives. This index
" is a weightedaverage of the tax differential between the importingstate
and the surrounding lower tax states, with weights based on the border
populations. A computational formula is given by equation (40).
Index which measures casual (export) smuggling incentives. This index
is a weighted average of the tax differential between the exportingstate
and the surrounding lower tax states, with weights based on the border
populations. A computational formula is givenby equation (41).
Index which measures the incentives to commercially smuggle
cigarettes fromKentucky, VirginiaandNorth Carolina to any state with
a lower cigarette excise tax rate within a thousand miles. This index is
positively related to the differencebetween the state's excise tax and the
excise taxes of the long-distance exporting states. The computational
formulas are given by equations (42), (43) and (46).
A structural break dummy variable which takes on a value of zero for
the years 1955 -1978 and one for the years 1979-1994.
The annual state cigarette excise-tax in state i in 1982-84 dollars.
The annual intercensal estimate of population in state i.
The border population of state i living within twenty miles of state j.
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Table 2. (continued)
Variable Description
Aweight that is positively related to the ratio of the value added from
Znc tobacco production in-the. state ofNorth Carolina to the sum ofthe value
added from tobacco production in the states ofNorth Carolinaand
' Virginia. A computational formula is provided by equation (47).
Aweight thatis positively related to theratio of thevalue added from
^vA tobacco production in the state ofVirginia to the sum ofthe value added
from tobacco production in the states ofNorth Carolina and Virginia. A
computational formula is provided by equation (48).
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Table s. Recipients ofCommercially Smuggled Cigarettes
Kentucky Importers
Arkansas
Illinois
. Iowa
J
Kansas
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
') ' • I
Missouri'
' Nebraska-
Oklahoma
• 'Wisconsin
•
;W
k
Virginia and North Carolina Importers
11
Alabama
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida "
Georgia
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
. Mississippi
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
' Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
' ' Vermont
:' Washington D.C.
•' -West Virginia
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Table 4. Pre-information and Post-information Goeilldents
Pre-informatiori Ppst-information
Variable - - Coefficient : - - Coefficient
c;;, Ti,=e, Tii+Yi=a,
C,,; 112 ^2+y2=<^2
P, ' 113= 02 -n3+Y3=tX,
{Variables
Regression
Coefficients Predicted Sign
- G,, ' Til Positive
Q+i .Zero
Pt . Tl3 Negative
INC, Tl4 Indeterminate
-SDTIMP, Tls Negative
SDTEXP, r\(, Negative
LDTAXj ll7 Negative
,INFO*Cm Yi Negative
INFO*Q,, Y2 Positive
. ,INFO*P, Y3 Positive
INFO*INC, Y4 Indeterminate
iNF6*SDTIMP, Y5 Indeterminate
INFO*SDTEXP, Yo Indeterminate
INFO*LDTAX, Yt Indeteniiiriate
47,:..
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Table 6. Sets ofLag and Lead Instruments for and C^,
J --''i ' ' I. 1"; t.. ,y.: Ji'.; : '
Model Instruments Used
-(i)
(iii) ' ' '
- J-. '.,.v
••i '(iv) .
I ..' - , A j
- . P,., andP,^,
P,^, T, and T,.,
P,.„P,^i:T„T,., andT-,^1
I i.cA-
i'' j'' •. Pt.2' ^t-h Pi+1 Tt' ' T ,.^1 and T;.2
. 11;
1 ',1
i' '1 • I , ;
I i '<
Table 7.' Sets of Lag Instruments for Q., and C^,
Model r
- : • '.(vi)
V
r.:-' .•••(vii)
i I
< ->'j
• j
' i ' ' : )":•• ' > r
' '• (r. !""
' '• .'i-J- J[- "
i'- ' ' - r • ! ,
>)f
- ,,'vf ."V
J ' V
."'-•.'u.l
I
•'',
<• i ^
Instruments Used
P,.i and P,.2
P,.„ T, and T,.,
Pt-2» T,.i-and T,.2'
. ' k
1 1
r ' 1
• • 'J?
V .. * i V
.U 'i
h--L !• I
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Table 8. Estimates of Cigarette Demand with Structural Breaks
Lags and Leads Included in Set of Instruments"
. (Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses)
Variables Coefficients 2SLS'' OLS-^
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (V)
Cm 0.557 0.445 0.509 0.562 0.489
(7.438) (6.411) (7.845) (9.696) (32.380)
. Tl2 0.054 0.105
0.013 0.056 0.437
(0.607) (1.210) (0.172) (0.784) (27.090)
P. ^3 -34.886 -39.473 -41.633 -34.290
-10.833
(-6.752) (-7.600) (-7.833) (-7.354) (-3.849)
INC, 0.184 0.223 0.227 0.180 0.061
(4.467) (5.328) (5.197) (4.631) (2.241)
SDTIMP, Tls f' -59.116 -59.513 -64.894 -58.706
-27.821
" (-5.826) (-5.665) (-6.105) (-6.001) (-4.132)
SDTEXP, .-60.478 -65.938 , -69.743 -59.726 -24.906
(-8.503) (-9.212) (-9.654) (-9.382) (-6.902)
LDTAX, ^7 -8.773 -9.670 -10.597 -9.059
-1.226
(-5.666) (-6.163) (-6.751) (-6.289) (-1.522)
INFO*C,., Yi . -0.246 -0.169
-0.248 -0.248 0.001
(-2.862) (-2.02) (-3.193) (-3.500) (0.392)
INFO*C,^, 72 0.294 0.232 0.314 0.291
-0.008
(3.360) (2.694) (3.938) (4.012) (-0.255)
INFO*?, Y3 15.305 17.350
18.511 15.545. 3.469
(3.357) (3.663) (3.766) (3.500) (1.059)
INFO*INC, Y4 -0.211 -0.258 -0.269 -0.205
-0.030
(-5.577) (-6.944) (-6.992) (-6.179) (-1.633)
INFO*SDTIMP, Y5 11.024 5.828
8.027 10.344 12.145
(1.149) (0.585) (0.776) (1.082) (1.702)
INFO*SDTEXP, Y6 14.518 16.384
18.338 13.872 -1.315
(1.963) (2.12) (2.288) (1.905) (-0.241)
INFO*LDTAX, Y7 -0.655
-0.717 -0.764 -0.920 -0.229
(-0.855) (-0.890) (-0.908) (-1.178) (-0.383)
0.970
N 1925 1925 1925 1874
1925
Intercepts are included in the estimation but not shown.
^Columns (i)-(iv) give 2SLS estimates with instruments described in Table 6.
•= Column (v) givesan OLS estimate.
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Table 10. Estimates of Cigarette Demand with Structural Breaks
Only Lags are Included in Set of Instruments^
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses)
Variables Coefficients 2SLS'
• (vi) (vii) (viii)
C,., "ni -1.157 -0.011 -0.140
(-0.809) (-0.066) (-0.854)
CI+1 ll2 2.841 • 0.953 r 1.245
(1.284) • (3.359) (4.660)
p. ^3 46.090 -9.547 2.357
(0.758) (-0.885) (0.243)
INC, ^4 -0.031 0.115 0.073
(-0.175) (2.168) . (1.394)
SDTIMP, ' ns • 22.751 1.333 • 5.142
(0.934) " (0.348) (1.467)
SDTEXP, Tl6 118.690 -3.990 18.499
(0.845) (-0.196) (0.912)
LDTAX, n? 78.471 -17.73.8 2.404 •
(0.746) (-1.051) (0.156)
INFO*C,., Yi 2.060 6.504 0.724
. (1.107) (2.193) (3.239)
' INFO*C,,, Y2. -2.141 -0.497 -0.741
(-1.099) (-2.008) (-3.135)
INFO*P, Y3 -27.376 1.990
-3.854
(-0.795) (0.298) , (-0.566)
INFO*INC, Y4 0.263 . -0.068
0.017
(0.765) (-0.958) (0.268)
INFO*SDTIMP, •Y5 2.443
-0.128 0.550
(0.713) • (-0.162) (0.552)
INFO^SDTEXP, Y6 -51.793
-7.615 -14.433
(-0.875.)' (-0.730) (-1.135)
INFO*LDTAX, Y7 -54.179 -6.749
-16.462
(-0.976) • (-0.646) (-1.502)
R' 0.759
N 1874 . 1925
1874
^Intercepts are included inthe estimation but not shown.
Columns (vi)-(viii) give 2SLS estimates with instruments described in Table 7.
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Table 13, Rational AddictionModel without Structural Breaks
Lagsand Leads Included in SetofInstruments*
" ' (Asymptotic,t-ratios are in parentheses) -- - •
RHS^-
Variables
2SLS ' 1 , OLS, ,
(i) ' (ii) (iii)' ^ ----(iy)r- -(V) -
Q:l- 0.517 0.396 , t 0.457 .0.513,.. 0.489
(9.041) (7.685). (9.881) (12.470) (36.760) .
C,i,- ' i- 0.173 0:247,'-, 0.162 0.1.88 . 0.441
(2.729) (4.001) (3.104) (3.932), (31.160).
-29.279 -33.265 . -35.212 -27.795, -9.558
(-7.489) (-8.379) > (-8.742) (-7:946) (-4.281),j
INC; -0.002 O^OlO.i -0.003 0;000 0.038
(-0.084) (0.355)7 (-0.121) (-0.004) (1.799)i,^
SDTIMP, -47.213 -4^.2770 i -53.466 -46.458. -20.382
r ^ *1^" (-6.700) (-6.752),; (-7.281) (-6^946) (r4.128)
SDTEXP' -55.012 -59.033'- ; -62.813 -53:165 -25.633
r (-9.321) (-9.744). (-10.360) (-9.962) (-7.321),
LDTAX^ -6.748 -7.006.0, -7.926 -6;857. -1.326
1 , ; , (-5.591) (-5.619), (-6.45) - (-5.986) (-1.743) .
R^\'. • . 0.974 0.972 ' 0.970 . 0.975 0.982 ,
B ' ' - 0.335 0.624'.- 0.354 0.366 0.902 ,
r 1 1.988 0.603 1.821 1.723 0.109 .
N 1925 1925 ~-• 1925"-
1874^-- - 1925 -
Intercepts included in theestimation butnot shown.
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Table 14. Rational Addiction Model Without Structural Breaks
' Only Lags are Included in Set of Instruments"
(Asymptotic t-ratios are in parentheses)
RHS
Variables - - (vi) _
2SLS •
(vii) (viii)':
c,., ... . . -0:872 0.095 0.060
(-0.792) ' (1.087) (0.676)
Q+i. 1441 • '' 0i861-" ^ 0.988
(1.432) (5.444) (6.836)
P.' 41.854 • -7;561 ' 0.013
(0:84ij "^••(-1.040)-':- " :• • (0.002) ;
INC; •0.378 • ' ' 0.105 0.134
(1:280) •" (2.925)" (3.549)"
SDTIMP, 84.651- • -7.359''. • ' 3.446
(0:876) - (-0:597) (0.303).
SDTEXP; 73.604 - • •-16.776 : i' '- -4.425
* (0.798) (-1.433) • . .. (-0.428)
LDTAX, ^ 20.686" K795 ' 1 ' 3.542
\ t • (1:021) - (0.739) (1.622)
P
r
N ^ ^
\0.780-
-i799
-1.357
1874
0.972--. •
9.063'
-0.89P
' ' 1925 -
0.967
' 16.467 ^
-0.940
1874 •;
Intercepts are included in'theestimation butnot shown.
' • '••T • .
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